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Abstract
This paper introduces an experiment aiming to investigate the contribution of illiquidity risk to the total
risk of a risky investment project. If implemented, the project succeeds with a known probability. Yet
the project fails if the quota of investors is not reached in the ﬁrst place. Hence strategic uncertainty
compounds its eﬀect with the "intrinsic risk" of the project. Results conﬁrm the insidious nature of
illiquidity: as long as a ﬁrst collective default does not occur, investors accept high intrinsic risk projects.
After a ﬁrst default, they become extremely prudent and come back to market only gradually. After
several defaults, private agents manage to coordinate on an relatively low intrinsic risk above which they
refuse to participate in the project. Macroeconomic policy implications follow.
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1 Introduction
In the past, illiquidity used not to be a top priority on economists’ research agenda, who shared the
optimistic belief according to which there will always be some deep-pocket investor able to rescue
an illiquid but solvent debtor. Yet during the Great Recession of 2007-2009, illiquidity turned into
a major factor of economic instability (Pedersen, 2009; Brunermeyer, 2009; Miller and Stiglitz,
2010). In a short lapse of time, in the last four months of 2008, traditional buyers of many asset
backed securities and bank commercial paper, almost vanished. Taking one representative quote
from The Economist of February 10th, 2010, "Many of those clobbered in the crisis, including
Bearn Sterns, Northern Rock and AIG — were struck down by a sudden lack of cash or funding
sources, not because they run out of capital." The 2010-2012 turmoil in Euro public debt markets
also carries the mark of illiquidity. There is today a widespread consensus among economists
and policymakers who acknowledge that illiquidity can originate major disruptions of economic
activity.
Classical theoretical papers analyze illiquidity as an ineﬃcient equilibrium outcome that can
arise when investors cannot coordinate their actions. The basic rationale was introduced by
Summers (2000, p.7):
A crude but simple game, related to Douglas Diamond and Philip Dybvig’s (1983)
celebrated analysis of bank runs, illustrates some of the issues involved here. Imagine
that everyone who has invested $10 with me can expect to earn $1, assuming that I
stay solvent. Suppose that if I go bankrupt, investors who remain lose their whole
$10 investment, but that an investor who withdraws today neither gains nor loses.
What would you do? Each individual judgment would presumably depend on one’s
assessment of my prospects, but this in turn depends on the collective judgment of all
of the investors. Suppose, ﬁrst, that my foreign reserves, ability to mobilize resources,
and economic strength are so limited that if any investor withdraws I will go bank-
rupt. It would be a Nash equilibrium (indeed, a Pareto-dominant one) for everyone
to remain, but (I expect) not an attainable one. Someone would reason that some-
1
one else would decide to be cautious and withdraw, or at least that someone would
reason that someone would reason that someone would withdraw, and so forth. This
phenomenon, which Douglas Hofstadter has labeled “reverberant doubt,” would likely
lead to large-scale withdrawals, and I would go bankrupt. It would not be a close-run
thing. John Maynard Keynes’s beauty contest captures a similar idea.
If illiquidity is ﬁrst and foremost a problem of poor coordination of investors, then the theory of
order-statistics coordination games can provide interesting insights. In these games, the individual
payoﬀ to some action is an increasing function in the number of agents that undertake that action
(Carlsson and van Damme, 1993; Morris and Shin, 1998; 2007). The core logic of these n-
player games can be inferred from the classical two-player ‘stag hunt’ game, where the fear of
lack of cooperation by the other, might prompt players not to adopt the cooperative behavior.
Bryant (1983) shows that in a complete information set-up these strategic complementarities
result in multiple equilibria with self-fulﬁlling beliefs. The polar situations where either all players
undertake the highest action (the Pareto dominant or payoﬀ dominant equilibrium) or the lowest
action (the highest security or minimax equilibrium) are intuitively appealing but cannot be
justiﬁed on pure deductive grounds. Morris and Shin (1998) work out an elegant solution for
equilibrium selection under the assumption that agents do not know the precise payoﬀ of the
others but receive private signals that allow them to approximate it. Rochet and Vives (2004) and
Morris and Shin (2009) develop models of illiquidity crises in the banking sector. Illiquidity arise
if banks cannot roll over their short-term debt due to coordination problems, while insolvency is
deﬁned as the riskiness of their long-term investment projects, conditional of not being illiquid at
the ﬁrst stage. They show that partial cooperation can be achieved under imperfect information
since Morris and Shin (1998) solution applies.1
Many scholars have brought order-statistics coordination games to the Lab, and reached sub-
stantial insights. It goes beyond the scope of this short paper to provide a comprehensive survey
of these experimental studies; many of them are summarized in Camerer (2003) and Devetag
1 See also Besancenot et al. (2004) for another model of interaction between insolvency and illiquidity risk.
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and Ortmann (2007). On the one hand, these studies suggest that the non-cooperative, Pareto
dominated equilibrium is rather resilient in games with complete information, a result ﬁrst put
forward by Van Huyck et al. (1990). On the other hand, there are many devices — such as cheap
talk, introduction of leaders, former experience with coordination, etc. — that can help engineering
better coordination. Heinemann, Nagel and Ockenfels (2009) develop a method to measure aver-
sion to strategic uncertainty in coordination games, similar to standards measures of risk aversion
in lottery choices. They show that aversion to strategic uncertainty and risk aversion seem to be
correlated among individuals. There are not many experimental studies that study illiquidity as a
coordinating failure in a speciﬁc investment frame. Schotter and Yorulmmazer (2009) and Madiès
(2006) have provided experimental analyses of bank runs; they focus on depositors’ decision to
pull out their money once that a bank becomes insolvent; Garratt and Keister (2009) analyze the
bank run problem in a sequential coordination game, and emphasize the consequences of early
withdrawals on the run. .
This paper develops a simple experiment aiming to investigate the contribution of illiquidity
(or coordination) risk to the total risk of an investment project. While we take our inspiration
from project ﬁnancing, we avoid using words such as "investment, investor, default" that have
their own emotional loading. The basic block is an "investment project" that, if implemented,
can deliver either a positive gain or nothing, with a known and predetermined probability. The
probability that the project delivers nothing is representative of its "intrinsic risk". Furthermore,
if the number of investors who choose to participate to the project is too small2 , the project
will not be implemented in the ﬁrst place and bring losses to investors, what we refer to as the
"illiquidity risk". If the number of investors is large enough, the project is implemented and
will succeed or not, depending on the above mentioned probability of success. Hence, in this
context, an investor must take into account not only the individual chances that his investment
will bring the high payoﬀ, but also the strategic uncertainty stemming from the decision of the
other investors. Basically, subjects can pay 20 cents in order to participate to a lottery that brings
them 30 cents with a probability q or nothing with probability (1 − q). The positive gain (that
2 In this paper, the critical number required for the success of the project will be exogenously given.
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occurs with the probability q) is delivered only if a majority of the subjects have participated to
the investment.
Five relatively large groups of subjects (the size of the groups varied from 9 to 16 subjects)
were asked to play this game for several rounds, for varying levels of the intrinsic risk (1 − q).
The risk level was increased in successive steps until a until a ﬁrst coordination default occurred,
then was reduced until coordination was restored, than raised again, following a cyclical pattern.
Thus the experiment aims to detect existence of a "threshold strategy" on which players will
coordinate their decisions at the term of a learning process.3 Requiring people to coordinate
on participating to a lottery (hence - an uncertain outcome) is, to the best of our knowledge, an
original contribution of this paper to existing experimental literature on coordination games.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces a theoretical benchmark that
should help to better gauge subjects’ behavior in the experiment. Section 4 introduces the exper-
iment (design and results). Section 5 presents our conclusion.
2 Theory: The illiquidity game
To bring some intuition to the experiment introduced in the next section and deﬁne the coor-
dination risk, we ﬁrstly analyze an elementary imperfect information game where a group of n
identical risk-neutral players (where n is an odd number) are invited to play a lottery L(0; 30)
against an investment of 20 cents. The lottery can pay:
L =

30 cents with a probability q
0 cent with a probability (1− q)
.
The winning probability q and its complement, the loss probability (1−q) are public information. In
order to bring into the picture strategic uncertainty, we impose an exogenously given participation
constraint according to which if less than x% of the players in the group participate to the lottery
they all get nothing whatever the outcome of the individual draw.
Given q, each player must decide whether to participate to the lottery (strategy p) or to refrain
(strategy p¯) depending on his own assessment of the actions of the others. In such a game, the
3 A concept developped by Heinemann et al. (2004), Heinemann et al. (2009).
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optimal strategy s of an individual i consists in choosing a reservation probability q∗
i
and play the
game if the actual probability is larger than this critical threshold (and vice-versa), i.e.:
si =


p, if q ≥ q∗
i
p¯, if q < q∗
i
. (1)
While in this game all individuals know the probability q (and 1−q), they might not have the same
perception of the illiquidity risk, which depends on the decision of all other players. Each individual
i will choose his speciﬁc reservation probability q∗
i
depending on his subjective expectation of the
behavior of the other members of the group.
Let us order the n players according to their own q∗
i
, from the lowest to the highest value.
We deﬁne as the "pivot player" the player m such that the number of players with q∗ > q∗m
represent x% of the total number of subjects. For an objective risk q, if the m−individual plays p
or "participate" (i.e., q > q∗
m
), then illiquidity does not arise; to the opposite, if he plays p¯, then
more than x% of the players do the same, and illiquidity occurs. It must be noticed that, when
taking their individual decision, players should consider only the decision of the pivot player, and
not the individual decision of all players. As a consequence, the outcome of this game should not
depend on the number of players.4
We denote by F i() the player’s i subjective c.d.f. of q∗m.
For a given probability of getting the positive gain in the lottery, q, the gain from participating
to the illiquidity game U i(p) is obtained by multiplying the positive payoﬀ in the lottery (30) by
the individual probability of winning (q) and by the probability that the pivot player participates
to the lottery, i.e. that q∗m is lower than q; this probability is deﬁned for the individual i as
Pri[q∗m < q] = F
i(q).
U i(p) = 30qF i(q) (2)
We notice that U i(p) is a monotonous increasing function in q with U i(p) = 0 for q = 0 and
U i(p) = 30 for q = 1.
4 If players can implement some form of coordination, the number players should matter.
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The reservation probability q∗
i
turns out to be the value of q such that an individual i is
indiﬀerent between the two strategies, i.e. U i(p¯) = U i(p), where in this game U i(p¯) = 20.
Formally, q∗
i
is the implicit solution to:
20 = 30qF i(q). (3)
Finally, we notice that without the participation constraint, a risk-neutral individual would partic-
ipate to the lottery if the winning probability exceeds a threshold qˆ, implicitly deﬁned by equation:
20 = 30q. (4)
If q < qˆ = 2/3, a risk-neutral, rational player will not participate to the lottery.
Figure 1 represents the left-hand terms in Eq. (3) and Eq. (4) as two functions of q. At
point A we get the critical winning probability in the elementary setting (individual decision, no
interaction), at point A′ the critical winning probability in the illiquidity game. Even in this
simpliﬁed context (homogenous, risk neutral players), in presence of the participation constraint
players require a higher winning probability (or a lower default probability) in order to enter the
lottery. Should investors have diﬀerent preferences towards risk, it would be more diﬃcult to
foresee the behavior of the pivot player (the p.d.f. of F would become wider and ﬂatter), and the
minimum wining probability required to participate would rise.
The experiment presented in the next section aims at analyzing how a group of "ﬂesh and
blood" decision makers behave within the former framework. For sure, human subjects are not
"homogenous"; they have their own psychological characteristics and biases (cognitive skills, var-
ious risk aversion, overconﬁdence/over prudence, learning abilities). The core issue is whether
players do assess correctly the strategic risk, and, if not, what is the risk learning process.
3 The Experiment
3.1 Experimental design
A total of 62 subjects were recruited by the ESSEC Experimental Laboratory from the student
population of the ESSEC Business School, who answered to a call for paid decision experiments.
The experimental design was presented via computer interface and all interactions were comput-
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Figure 1: Illiquidity game: the winning probability thershold
erized. The programme was written in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Instructions were read aloud.
Throughout the sessions students were not allowed to communicate and could not see the others’
screen. [see Appendix 2 for the instructions].
At the beginning of each experiment, students were aﬀected to a group, and the composition
was kept constant over the rounds in within-subjects design.
Two conditions were implemented. Table 1 presents the schedule of the sessions.5
In the ﬁrst condition (C1), there is a Phase A where a group of students is faced in each round
with the individual choice of investing 20 cents in the lottery L(0; 30); the loss probability (1− q)
is increased in each round, rising from 0.05 to 0.70 with a step of 0.05. In the Phase B, referred
to as the "illiquidity game", the same group of students is given the choice of investing 20 cents
in the lottery L(0; 30), but this time interdependence between subject’s decision is introduced in
the following way: if less than 50% of the players participate in that round, participants receive
nothing regardless of the lottery outcome, if 50% or more participate, they get the outcome of the
lottery draw. Therefore, in the second phase players face not only the investment "intrinsic risk"
5 In both treatments, a short warming-up unpaid test (see Appendix 2) aimed to make them at ease with the
basic lottery.
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but also strategic uncertainty related to the choice of the other component in the group.
At each round, the screen inviting the subject to participate to the game recalls the possible
payoﬀs, indicates the "intrinsic risk" (1−q) of the lottery at that round and the percent of students
who played the lottery at the previous round. At the end of the round, subjects are informed
about the frequency of participants, and what is their gain for that round.6
In the second condition (C2), subjects were submitted only to the Phase B.
Phase A Phase B Sessions
C1 yes yes
S1
S2
S3
May 2010 (9 subjects)
June 2010 (15 subjects)
Nov. 2010 (16 subjects)
C2 no yes
S4
S5
April 2011 (10 subjects)
May 2011 (12 subjects)
Table 1. Schedule of experiments
In the "illiquidity game" (phase B), the intrinsic risk (i.e., the loss probability 1−q) was varied
according to a simple rule. The game starts at t = 0 with a small default risk, (1− q) = 0.15. As
long as no illiquidity default occurs, the risk is increased by 0.05 from one round to another (like
in Phase A). If an illiquidity default occurs, the same level of risk is submitted once again. Then,
if illiquidity arises, the level of risk is reduced by 0.05 at the next round; if else, it is increased
by 0.05. The experiment stops after 31 rounds (when, in a pre-test study, we noticed that the
decision pattern becomes stable).
The rule according to which (1 − q) was changed from one round to another was not made
explicit. It is hard to say whether subjects were able to guess the rule over such a short experiment,
and, if they did, whether they used this information to shape their behavior.7 Using random
draws to get the probabilities (1− q) would have been a more accurate way to detect the critical
"participate/do not participate" threshold, but would also have consumed much more resources.
6 If the gain is zero, and the frequency of participants is larger than 50%, the subject can infer that the draw
was unfavorable.
7 In a dynamic set-up, for a relatively high risk, subjects might refuse to invest because they anticipate that the
risk will be reduced, which would create a better opportunity to invest in the future and vice-versa.
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At the end of the game the software indicates the total gain of every student. A short satisfac-
tion survey is implemented. These experiments last for 45 minutes on average. Students earned
on average 13.25 euros from playing the game; the amount includes 5 euros for showing up. Group
size vary depending on the number of students that answered to the call.
3.2 Results
Table 2 displays the summary of the results of the individual choice (Phase A): the outcome of an
individual decision depends only on the loss probability (1−q). Cell data indicates show the number
of students who accepted to participate to the L(0; 30) lottery, for various loss probabilities.
(1− q) = 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70
Session 1, May 26, 2010
N=9 8 8 9 9 9 8 6 7 5 6 4 2 2 2
Session 2, June 9, 2010
N=15 15 15 15 14 14 14 11 9 5 5 2 1 1 2
Session 3, Nov. 3, 2010
N=16 14 15 16 15 15 13 10 8 9 8 7 1 2 0
Table 2. Number of students that choose to play the lottery in the individual decision setting
We observe that less than 50% of the students accept to participate to the lottery when the loss
probability (or the intrinsic risk) (1− q) ﬁrst exceeded 0.55 in the ﬁrst and third group, and 0.45
in the second group. Notice that in a pure Von Neumann - Morgenstern decision problem, risk
neutral individuals would not participate to this lottery if the risk is above 0.33. Furthermore, we
would expect that, for small gains as provided in our experiment, subjects were risk neutral. Yet,
in this experiment, not participating to the lottery is associated to "inaction", while participating
is associated to "action" (i.e., "do something"). Our subjects are not necessarily risk lovers (i.e.,
if they have the choice between two lotteries with the same expected gain, they would choose the
less riskier one), but behave as if they were risk lovers because they reap a small beneﬁt from
acting rather than waiting (they love to play). This bias has no impact on the subsequent results,
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since the entry level decision ("bet 20 cents") is the same in all treatments.8
Tables 3 and 4 presents the main results of the "illiquidity game" in the Condition 1 (Phases
A and B) and Condition 2 (Phase B only). Columns have two main labels: "nth default" and
"r-to-m" for "return-to-market". For instance, in the column "1st default", cell data indicate the
loss probability (1−q) that triggered the ﬁrst illiquidity default (i.e. less than 50% of the subjects
participate to the lottery). The adjacent "r-to-m" column indicates the loss probability when 50%
of the subjects or more decided to participate again (return-to-market). The same sequence is
repeated three more times, for the second, third and fourth default. Between brackets we indicate
the number of students who accepted to play the lottery for that "threshold" probability. In
Appendix 1 we present graphs that show the evolution of the group decision during the experience
(for each group).
1st default r-to-m 2nd default r-to-m 3rd default r-to-m 4th default r-to-m
Session 1, May 26, 2010
N=9 0.40 (4) 0.25 (7) 0.40 (0) 0.25 (6) 0.35 (1) 0.25 (6) 0.35 (1) x
Session 2, June 9, 2010
N=15 0.45 (4) 0.35 (10) 0.40 (6) 0.30 (12) 0.40 (1) 0.30 (13) 0.40 (0) 0.30 (12)
Session 3, Nov. 3, 2010
N=16 0.40 (7) 0.25 (8) 0.35 (6) 0.25 (10) 0.30 (7) 0.25 (15) 0.30 (2) 0.25 (14)
Table 3. Default and return-to-market probability thresholds (1− q) in Condition 1
(Between brackets, the number of students who participate to the lottery)
1st default r-to-m 2nd default r-to-m 3rd default r-to-m 4th default r-to-m
Session 4, April 6, 2011
N=10 0.50 (2) 0.35 (6) 0.45 (2) 0.40 (6) 0.45 (2) 0.40 (6) 0.45 (1) 0.40 (6)
Session 5, May 18, 2011
N=12 0.55 (1) 0.35 (7) 0.45 (1) 0.35 (8) 0.45 (2) 0.35 (11) 0.45 (2) x
8 Another explanation would involve noise in the data, in particular if subjects do not believe that the displayed
probabilities were the true ones. In order to reduce such noise, subjects should have played the game many more
times, but this is hard to implement in the Lab (subjects would become tired and bored).
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Table 4. Default and return-to-market probability thresholds (1− q) in Condition 2
(Between brackets, the number of students who participate to the lottery)
Let us ﬁrstly analyze the data relative to the illiquidity game. The ﬁrst default occurs for
(1 − q) = 0.40 in groups 1 and 3, and 0.45 in group 2; in Condition 2, it was 0.50 and 0.55 in
groups 4 and 5. Once that illiquidity default occurs for the ﬁrst time, subjects adopt a security
attitude, and refuse to participate to the lottery until the intrinsic risk is reduced in a substantial
way (at 0.25 for groups 1 and 3, 0.35 for groups 2, 4 and 5). We can state that:
R1. The ﬁrst time they play the illiquidity game, subjects seem to be over-conﬁdent and accept
high intrinsic risk projects. After a ﬁrst default, they become "excessively prudent" and accept to
participate only if the intrinsic risk is much lower. This bipolar pattern holds in both conditions.
After few defaults (not more than three), subjects manage to coordinate their strategies around
an "asymptotic" threshold default probability, above which they refuse to participate to the lottery.
The number of persons that coordinate their decision around this critical value increases over the
rounds; after three defaults, almost all individuals in the sample coordinate their decision on that
level. This coordination is explained by learning about the strategies of the other players.
R2. At the term of the learning process, (heterogenous) subjects coordinate their actions on a
threshold strategy; they (almost) all accept to participate to the lottery if the intrinsic risk is below
this threshold, and vice versa.
The fourth (asymptotic) default probability threshold is lower than the probability default
threshold of the ﬁrst default for all ﬁve sessions.
R3. At the term of the learning process, a large majority of subjects refuse to participate to
the project if the intrinsic risk exceeds a threshold much lower than they accepted before the ﬁrst
default.
Data from the individual decision problem (C1, Phase A) can also provide some interesting
insights. In this ﬁrst stage, the only risk that matters is the "intrinsic risk" since there is no
participation constraint. We noticed that, depending on their tastes for risk and playing the
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game, 50% or more of the subjects bet on the lottery if the intrinsic risk raised above 0.55 in
groups 1 and 3, and 0.45 in group 2 (Table 1). In the Condition 2, the ﬁrst default threshold in
the illiquidity game is at 0.50 for group 4, and 0.55 for group 5.
R4. Before a ﬁrst default has occurred, subjects do not seem able to gauge well the coordination
risk.
The speciﬁc coordination risk might be estimated by the diﬀerence in the risk levels where 50%
of the players accept to play the lottery in the individual decision problem and the asymptotic
threshold default probability in the illiquidity game. Yet, in order to rule out the carry-over eﬀect,
we should compare results from Phase A of C1 with Phase B of C2, knowing that results can be
biased by group heterogeneity speciﬁc to between-subjects measures. With perfectly homogenous
groups, the diﬀerence would be representative of the speciﬁc coordination risk. Unfortunately in
our data, we cannot observe a signiﬁcant diﬀerence.
3.3 A pooled data analysis
A simple pooled data analysis allows us to emphasize as a general pattern the systematic down-
wards revision in the illiquidity default thresholds. In order to do so, we report for each experiment
the probabilities that triggered the ﬁrst, second, third, fourth and ﬁfth default; the order number
n of the default is similar here to the time dimension in standard panel data analysis.
We denote by TDPsn the threshold default probability corresponding to the n
th default in
session s, with n = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and s = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. Data for C1 experiments (S1, S2, S3) come
from Table 3, and data for C2 experiments (S4, S5) come from Table 4; there are 23 observations
available. The ﬁve series are displayed in Figure 2, where the horizontal axis indicates the default
order number (ﬁrst, second, etc.) and the vertical axis indicates the threshold default probability.
We then run the regression:
TDPsn = Fs + an+ bn
2 + ǫsn (5)
where Fs is the ﬁxed eﬀect for each session (a dummy variable), n is, as already mentioned, the
order number or the default, a and b are coeﬃcients and ǫsn is an error term. The quadratic form
is interesting since it allows for a dampening eﬀect, representative of the convergence put forward
12
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Figure 2: Threshold default probability in the 5 sessions
in the descriptive statistics.
The OLS estimation of Equation (5) are displayed in Table 4. The dependent variable is the
threshold default probability TDPsn. Model 1 is a special case of model 2, where we omit the
quadratic term.
Variable MODEL 1 MODEL 2
n -0.0175*** -0.0700***
n^2 — 0.0091***
Fixed eﬀects (cross section)
F1 0.419*** 0.482***
F2 0.462*** 0.520***
F3 0.383*** 0.440***
F4 0.513*** 0.560***
F5 0.519*** 0.582***
Nb obs. (unbalanced) 23 23
R2−Adjusted 0.857 0.923
Proba(F-stat) 0.00 0.00
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(***) indicates signiﬁcance at 1%.
Table 5. Output of the regression model
As expected, the coeﬃcient a is negative in both models: players revise downwards their default
thresholds. In model 2, the small and positive coeﬃcient of the quadratic term is also consistent
with our expectations: after several successive defaults, the strength of the adjustment is declining.
From model 1, we notice that from the ﬁrst to the fourth default, on average the default threshold
would vary by −0.0525, i.e. 11% below the average ﬁrst default threshold. Model 2 would suggest
that after three more defaults, the default threshold would vary by −0.0735, i.e., 14% below the
average ﬁrst default threshold.
Fixed eﬀects in condition C2 (F4 and F5) are systematically higher than in treatment C1 (F1,
F2, F3), indicating that the carry over eﬀect speciﬁc to C1 is not negligible (subjects seem to be
more prudent if they ﬁrstly performed the individual decision test).
4 Conclusion and some policy implications
The Asian crisis of 1997, the Argentinean default of 2001, the 2007-2009 Great Recession, and the
recent turmoil in Euro-area public debt markets are all representative episodes of the dramatic
consequences of sudden investors’ panic. While anyone would agree that in a ﬁnancially globalized
world illiquidity tends to become a major factor of economic instability, research on the origin and
mechanisms of illiquidity is relatively scarce.
This paper develops an experiment to study how strategic uncertainty contributes to the total
risk of a collective investment project. In the experiment, the failure of the project can be brought
about either by an internal, speciﬁc risk or by poor coordination of investors. Results conﬁrm the
insidious nature of illiquidity: as long as a ﬁrst coordination default does not happen, subjects
appear to be "overconﬁdent": a majority of investors accept to participate to projects featuring
a high intrinsic risk. But after a ﬁrst illiquidity default, they fall in the opposite direction and
become extremely cautious; they come back to markets only if the intrinsic risk is much reduced.
In the experiment, it took a small number of such default cycles to reach a threshold default
probability around which investors coordinate their actions; this fast learning process might be
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explained by the risk adjustment rule that favoured cyclical behavior. In a more rigorous setting,
subject should have been submitted to loss probabilities drawn at random. The learning process
would have been slower; unfortunately this alternative methodology is diﬃcult to implement, since
it requires much more observations.
One peculiar feature of our experiment is that a majority of subjects behave as if they were
risk lovers. This can be explained by the incentive scheme, where subjects get a small endowment
at the beginning of each iteration, and are asked to make a bet on a lottery. In the Lab, making
a bet is associated to "taking an action", as opposed to "doing nothing". For sure, our subjects,
made up of young students, have a natural bias to act rather than to wait. However, this "acting
bias" does not challenge our main ﬁndings, since the same subjects played the same game under
various conditions and for several times; whatever their incentive to participate to the lottery,
their behavior changes when strategic uncertainty is introduced.
Further research might test the game for varying participation thresholds as in Heinemann
et al. (2009), or make this participation threshold endogenous. The intrinsic risk of default was
known, while in real life investors can be subject to ambiguity. The advantage of this simple
experiment is that it can disentangle the illiquidity risk (stemming from poor coordination) from
the total risk of an investment project.
Our ﬁndings might shed some light on several policy issues. Immediately after a ﬁrst illiquidity
default, subjects in our experiment adopted a security stance and refused to lend until the intrinsic
risk declined in a substantial way. This second eﬀect can explain a phenomenon of crisis hysteresis.
Before the Great Recession, banks were ﬁnancing many high risk projects. Yet after the crisis,
the same banks were criticized on ground that they were too cautious, and did not lend enough.
Our analysis points out that this extremely prudent attitude is the normal behavioral response
after an illiquidity-driven crisis.
Today there is a large debate on what should be the appropriate response of the ECB to the
Euro debt crisis. In the light of this paper, as long as the Euro area does not possess a genuine
"lender-of-last-resort" (like the US or the UK), investors in Euro area public debts must consider
both the insolvency risk and the illiquidity risk. No wander that in the 2010-2012 period, interest
15
rates on 10-year T-bonds in Spain and Italy spiked so often, and only the commitment of the
ECB, in September 2012, to bail out distressed governements managed to bring some relief to the
Euro bond markets.
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5 Appendix 1. Data for Phase B (illiquidity game) experi-
ments
[Appendix 1 and 2 might be made availbe online only , not in a printed version]
The ﬁgures below indicate the evolution of illiquidity defaults depending on the level of risk.
The computer chooses the level of risk according to the rule presented in Figure 2.
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6 Appendix 2. Instructions for the C1 experiment9
Screen 1. Welcome to the ESSEC Experimental Laboratory. This experiment aims at studying
the interaction between two risks and their consequences on the individuals’ decisions. There will
be two stages, one warming-up non-paid stage, and a paid stage. Pay attention please: the game
progresses when the last player take his/her decision.
THE WARMING-UP TEST
Screen 2. Lotteries. It costs you 20 cents to participate to a lottery. The lottery will allow
you either to gain 30 cents or nothing.
Screens 3-4-5. Would you pay 20 cents to participate to a lottery that brings you 30 cents
with a probability of 60% (50%, 40%) and 0 cents with a probability of 40% (50%, 60%) ? Yes/No.
THE INDIVIDUAL DECISION TEST
Screen 6. From now on the experiment will be paid. You receive the money at the beginning
of each game and the decisions are material.
Screen 7. You will receive 20 cents at each round of the game. You can use them to buy
the right to play a lottery. If you play the lottery, you lose and the gain is zero or you can win
30 cents. The loss probability will be displayed on the screen. This is the true probability used
by the computer to pick the outcome. If you answer Yes to the question "do you accept to play
the lottery" the participation fee is charged and you will beneﬁt of the outcome of the lottery.
Payment rule: if you do not play, the 20 cents are kept on your account. If you play and win,
your account is credited of 30 cents. If you play an loose, your account is credited of 0 cents.
Screens 8 and next. Number of the actual round [1 to 14]. The loss probability is [1− q].10
"Do you accept to play this lottery ?" Yes/No.
Screens 8’ and next. Outcome of the round. You decided not to play; your gain is [20]. OR
You decided to play; you gain is [0 or 30].
9 Original instructions in French.
10 From one round to another, 1− q will be increased by 0.05, from 0.05 to 0.70.
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THE "ILLIQUIDITY GAME"
Screen 9. In this conﬁguration the outcome of the game depends on both your choice and
the choice of the group members.
As before, you get 20 cents at each round. You can use them to buy the right to play a lottery
that delivers either 30 cents or 0 cents. As before, this external probability of the zero payoﬀ is
indicated at each round.
At diﬀerence with the previous game:
- if at least [50%] of the players in the group participate, the loss / win outcome depends only
on this external probability.
- if less than [50%] of the players participate to the lottery, the gain is [zero] for all players
who participated to the lottery.
Slide 10. Examples
Example 1. There are 20 subjects. The displayed probability of loss is [1− q]. For this level of
risk, 6 players participate, 14 do not. Less than [50%] participate.
Outcome: All those who participate get zero, all those who did not keep the 20 cents.
Example 2. There are 20 subjects. The displayed probability of loss is [1− q]. For this level of
risk, 18 players participate, 2 do not. More than [50%] participate.
Outcome: Those who did not participate keep the 20 cents. Those who participate get 30
cents with a probability [q] and zero with a probability [1− q].
Screens 11 and next. Number of the actual round [1 to 31]. The loss probability is [1−q].11
At the former round, the percentage of subjects that participated to the lottery was of [y%]. "Do
you accept to play the lottery ?" Yes/No.
Screens 11’ and next. Outcome of that round. The loss probability was [1−q]. You decided
to participate (not to participate). The percentage of participants is [z%], i.e. more (less) than
[50%]. Your gain is [30 or zero].
11 From one round to another, this probability will vary starting from 0.15 according to the rule described in
Section 2.
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Screen 12. Your total gain for the experieemnt is [A] euros. Thank you for having participate
to this experiment.
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